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Blueprints

One system worth building, every week

Not app ideas. Complete designs — the mechanism, the mathematics, what it earns, and what breaks it.

Every figure below is derived from the protocol's published parameters. If governance moves one, the arithmetic moves with it and the blueprint says which.

1 published5 in the pipeline
01
Blueprint · published

The liquidity underwriter

Serve large withdrawals instantly out of your own SUI, reclaim from the pool at the next natural tranche rotation, and get paid for the difference. The pool stops having its yield engine reset by exit traffic; you earn a fee for holding inventory.

The problem

Exits reset the thing that earns the prize

Principal is staked in six tranches of staggered age. A tranche has to sit for six complete Sui epochs before it is rotated and its rewards realised — that is where the prize comes from.

A 10% liquidity buffer stays unstaked so ordinary withdrawals never touch the ladder. But a withdrawal larger than the buffer pulls tranches off the ladder head regardless of maturity, and a tranche pulled at age four realises nothing. Its clock starts again from zero.

This is not hypothetical. It is the documented reason this pool ran with zero realised yield through its early epochs: continuous withdrawal traffic kept the ladder permanently immature. Exit traffic is the yield engine’s main adversary, and nothing in the protocol currently absorbs it.

The mechanism

Stand between the exit and the ladder

  1. A depositor wants out with an amount larger than the remaining buffer.
  2. You pay them immediately, in full, from your own SUI. They are done — same block, no wait, no ladder touched.
  3. You take their exit position and reclaim from the pool at the next natural rotation, when a mature tranche comes off the ladder anyway.
  4. You keep a fee for having carried the timing risk.

The user is never worse off — they were leaving anyway and they leave sooner. The pool is strictly better off: a rotation that would have been forced early now happens on schedule. You are paid for inventory and patience.

The mathematics

Sizing capital against the exit tail

Two numbers decide whether this is a business. Both are estimable from the public event stream before you commit a single SUI.

When the ladder gets hitP(disturbance) = P(W − D > b)

W is withdrawals in an epoch, D is deposits, b is the remaining buffer. Netting deposits against withdrawals is free and already removes most events — you only underwrite the residual tail.

What the fee has to clearfee ≥ r · E[T] · amount + σ-premium

r is your cost of capital per epoch, E[T] the expected hold time to the next rotation — bounded above by the six-epoch ladder depth — and the premium covers the variance in T, not its mean.

Because T is bounded, this is a genuinely well-behaved inventory problem rather than an open-ended loan book. Your worst case is knowable: you hold for at most one full ladder cycle. Size your float against the tail of the exit-size distribution, not its mean — the mean exit never touches the buffer, and the whole business lives in the tail.

Estimate all of it from WithdrawalMade and DepositMade events over the pool’s history. The distribution you need is already public.

The build

Non-custodial, off-chain, no Move required

  • Watch the event stream for exits approaching the buffer edge.
  • Quote a fee from your inventory model and the current ladder ages.
  • Settle with the user directly; reclaim from the pool on rotation.
  • Publish your fills. An underwriter whose quotes are public is one people route to.

You never hold user funds — you pay them out. That single property is what keeps this a service rather than a custody business, and it is worth designing around from the first line.

What breaks it

Read this before you fund the float

  • Correlated exits. Withdrawals cluster. Size for the day everyone leaves at once, not the average day.
  • Parameter risk. Governance can move the buffer and the ladder depth within compiled ceilings. Both are inputs to your pricing — watch ConfigUpdated and reprice, or you are quoting yesterday’s protocol.
  • You are taking real risk. The no-loss guarantee protects depositors’ principal. It does not protect yours. This is a business with a balance sheet, and it can lose money.
  • Regulatory shape. Fronting capital against a future claim looks like credit in some jurisdictions. Get advice before you scale it.

Everything this needs is already public

The exit-size distribution, the ladder ages and the buffer state all come off the public event stream — you can size the model before committing a single SUI.
The events you needHow the ladder works
The pipeline

What’s coming, and in what order

Published in advance so you can take one before we write it. If you build a blueprint, it becomes yours — we will link to it rather than compete with it.

  • 02

    Honest odds

    Next

    The calculator nobody has built: what a depositor’s real distribution of outcomes looks like over a year, including the part where the expected value is slightly negative.

    Earns
    None directly — it is the trust asset that makes every interface above it credible.
    Maths
    Geometric waiting time, binomial win counts, expected value net of both protocol fees.
    WeekendAnalyticsRead-only
  • 03

    Sponsored epochs as acquisition

    Queued

    A model for protocols and DAOs buying depositors by funding a prize, with cost per acquired depositor measured on chain instead of guessed.

    Earns
    For the sponsor: TVL and attention, priced per SUI spent, with a public receipt.
    Maths
    Elasticity estimation from settlement history, CAC and payback under decay.
    WeekendGrowthAnalytics
  • 04

    The multi-validator ladder

    Queued

    Spread the stake ladder across validators to raise realised yield and remove the single-validator dependency the protocol currently has.

    Earns
    A share of the yield uplift, or a service fee from the pool that gains it.
    Maths
    Constrained optimisation over commission, performance and liquidity; rebalancing cost.
    Protocol workMoveYieldResilience
  • 05

    Syndicates

    Queued

    Let a group save together and agree in advance how a win is split, with the split provable rather than promised.

    Earns
    A fee on syndicate formation, or on the win it distributes.
    Maths
    Time-weighted fair division; proving a split is envy-free when deposits arrive at different times.
    Serious buildSocialAccounting
  • 06

    The charity pool

    Queued

    A pool whose prize routes to a cause instead of a winner. Depositors give up interest, never principal — the most honest form of giving there is.

    Earns
    Nothing for you. Everything for the argument that this primitive is worth having.
    Maths
    Straightforward — the difficulty here is legal structure, not arithmetic.
    Protocol workMoveSocial

Want one sooner?

The order is not fixed. A builder who is actually blocked on one moves it to the front faster than any roadmap does — say so in the community channels.